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I. Introduction
Under what circumstances does improving health raise productivity?
How quickly does this happen? And when is this payoff large or just a
fizzle? These are the questions addressed by Ashraf, Lester, and Weil.
They are important questions without doubt. In the empirical literature
to date, estimates of the effect of health on output range from the ex-
tremely positive to the substantially negative. Ashraf et al.’sa p p r o a c h —
which has numerous merits to it, especially on incorporating population
into the analysis—points us to a fairly compact middle ground on these
estimates. This conclusion has a certain aesthetic appeal, but, in the end,
I think that such precise predictions are difficult because of limitations of
their simulation model and uncertainties about numerous parameters. I
discuss my reasoning and provide a few empirical examples below.
The first theme of my comments is that health is multifaceted and
that the type of health change matters for economic outcomes. Consider
the following different improvements in health: better sanitation re-
duces infant mortality; eradication of parasitic disease reduces child-
hood morbidity (sickness short of death); low‐cost HIV medicine
shrinks adult mortality; an arthritis treatment curtails old‐age morbid-
ity; and improved treatments for pneumonia reduce old‐age mortality.
These are very different types of health improvements, and, intuitively,
they will have different types of economic effects. An attempt to model
all of health as a single index will run into trouble at some point. Most
of the authors’ results, however, are predicated on such a single‐index
assumption, linking health and human capital changes via a series of
reduced‐form relationships. I am concerned that some of the undergird-
ing reduced‐form equations might buckle if we do not have the 100%
right model of health.
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swer for the “average” disease, but most diseases are not average. This
last detail matters. Because of this heterogeneity, there is probably a
much larger range of possible outcomes from health improvements
than the bounds that the authors simulate in their “best‐case” and
“worst‐case” scenarios. Moreover, the most obvious policy levers to
push on are not ones that improve general health, but instead are tar-
geted at particular problems. Just as how Mister Wong and Professor
Viner got to choose their lowest cost curve, so we could opt to intervene
in a way skewed toward health improvements with higher payoffs.
This means that the average returns from realized interventions would
be higher than the return from treating the average disease.
In this vein, I consider the specific case of malaria. I argue that the
authors’ simulation understates the long‐run effect of malaria on income
byatleastanorderofmagnitude.First,whiletheacutesymptomsofma-
laria are measured by Ashraf et al., the disease is also characterized by
long bouts of subclinical morbidity that are poorly measured. Second,
morbidity during childhood might depress human capital formation,
but the authors force this effect to work via years of schooling, which
misses a lot and is itself a channel of second‐order importance. Third, I
review some of my recent estimates of the impact of childhood malaria
exposure on adult income and find them to be considerably larger than
the authors’ simulations of the whole impact of malaria.
Finally, I discuss Ashraf et al.’s results on population. The expected
response of population to health depends crucially on (a) whether the
improvement is for mortality or morbidity and (b) how fertility re-
sponds to health. Their approach to fertility adjustment is seemingly
comprehensive, but I provide below several examples of reasonably
well‐identified studies that give results outside the range of their simu-
lations. I suggest an alternative framework but argue that further re-
search is needed. Second, I discuss some limitations to the authors’
Malthusian approach to population and income, especially in an urban-
ized and progressively integrating world. Third, I review some studies
that estimate general equilibrium effects of health and find that the re-
sults of two out of three of them lie outside the range of their best/
worst simulations.
II. Points of Agreement
But before I get on to the criticism, let me set the stage by reviewing
some substantial points of agreement.
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will work through early‐life exposure to disease, and this implies that
there will be long lags before the effect on income is felt. An increase in
child health could improve physical and cognitive development in
childhood, but we have to wait for those cohorts to enter the labor
force. This transition can take the better part of a century.
Second, time lost to adult disability in poor countries is nontrivial but
small relative to the income gaps between rich and poor countries. The
direct cost of disability—idleness from disease—is a small fraction of
work hours. However, we know little about indirect effects of adult dis-
ability, such as ones that reduce the quality of labor input.
Third, when the health environment changes, so will the size and
composition of the population. On the one hand, the effective supply
of labor will increase: reducing mortality will increase the supply of
warm bodies, whereas reducing morbidity will increase the amount
those warm bodies can work. On the other hand, the returns to differ-
ent types of skills will change, which in turn will alter people’s human
capital investment decisions. These resulting shifts in quantities sup-
plied should all change relative prices. Accordingly, we need a general
equilibrium model. Ashraf et al. use a standard neoclassical framework,
combining a demographically driven change in effective labor with
both a fixed factor and a slowly adjusting capital stock. This seems like
the right way to start.
Fourth, the simple correlation between health and economic growth
(or level of output) such as that present in cross‐country comparisons is
hard to interpret as the causal effect of health if micro or cohort‐based
studies are used as the guide. The authors support this view, although it
bears mentioning that their model is neoclassical, in which health enters
(directly or indirectly) as a level shift in the supply of effective labor.
Growth is ruled out by assumption, except as part of a transition path
to a new level following an improvement in health. What about health
and the level of output? I agree with the authors that the micro/cohort
evidence for causal effects of health on output falls short of the magni-
tude implied by a bivariate cross‐country regression. How far short it
falls is nevertheless something we disagree on.
Here endeth the agreeable part. In my judgment, the existing micro
literature does point to effects of (some types of) health on output that
are modestly sized. Note that I mean “modest” from the point of view
of a macro/development economist: the income gap between Zambia
and Sweden, for example, is very large, and the micro estimates of
health effects explain only a small fraction of this difference. However,
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mates (including a few of my own) can seem quite large. From a policy
perspective, some of these policy interventions look to me like low‐
hanging fruit.
III. Malaria and Beyond
In my judgment, the simulation by Ashraf et al. understates the long‐
run benefits of eradicating malaria by at least an order of magnitude. I
discuss their simulation of the impact of malaria and how their main
assumptions provide a limited picture of the disease’s economic impact.
Below, I review evidence that just one channel—childhood exposure—
has an effect on adult income that is about a factor of 10 larger than the
authors’ estimate. Because they make use of a hypothetical malaria erad-
ication in Zambia as a test bed for their simulation, I do so as well.
1
One issue is that malarial fevers are only part of the morbidity asso-
ciated with the disease. The benchmark used by the authors comes
from the Global Burden of Disease project, which treats the prevalence
of malaria as being the incidence of malarial fevers times the average
fever duration (33% per year for adults and a few days, respectively, in
Zambia, according to Ashraf et al.). The product of these two numbers
is not very big. In words, fevers do not leave people so knocked out that
they cannot work, except for a small fraction of the time. This datum is
reminiscent of numerous studies of malaria from the 1960s that used
time‐use surveys to estimate the work time lost from experiencing a
bout of malarial fever at a given moment. The conclusion of this litera-
ture was that the direct, contemporaneous effect of fevers on productiv-
ity was low (of order 1%). What is missing from this picture is that
fevers are simply the most acute realization of sickness from malaria
(the tip of the iceberg, as it were). Persistent infection from malaria
(and almost all infection from malaria is persistent) causes considerable
subclinical morbidity, including anemia.
2
Of particular concern is the childhood morbidity associated with ma-
laria, which has been shown to have particularly strong and long‐lasting
effects. Among children, malaria has been associated with stunting of
physical and cognitive development, and it is not a leap to imagine that
this reduces the return to human capital investment. Further, these dam-
ages would be hard to undo later on. But how to estimate the later‐life
impact?
One strategy to estimate such impacts is to use years of schooling, as
the authors do, but this would yield an incomplete picture. As they
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Lucas [2007a]) is much larger than what we would predict on the basis
of only its effect on longevity, in part because of its substantial child
morbidity. But how much does childhood sickness affect income
through education? Consider the individual’s discounted lifetime in-
come, y, at the optimal choice of schooling, y ≡yðe ;hÞ, where e is years
of education and h is health (thought of here as less morbidity in child-
hood). This will respond to health via two channels, as seen by taking
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The first term values the increase in years of schooling (de =dh) at the
marginal return to schooling (∂y=∂eje ). But notice that, by the envelope
condition, the marginal return to schooling (for lifetime income) is zero
at the optimal choice of schooling. So, changes in the quantity of educa-
tion (i.e., time in school) are not of first‐order importance and should es-
sentially wash out to zero.
The second term measures the direct effect of health on labor produc-
















The first part is the effect of health on income for those with no educa-
tion (e ¼ 0), and the second part is the changing returns to inframargi-
nal schooling investments. These latter terms point to first‐order
benefits of health by raising the inframarginal return to education. In
words, childhood health can raise the quality of education received
(children can learn better, e.g.), and this can produce an increase in in-
come of first‐order importance.
In my own work (Bleakley 2007b), I attempt to directly estimate the
effect of one’s childhood exposure to malaria on income later in adult-
hood. I analyze malaria eradication campaigns in the United States (cir-
ca 1920)
3 and in Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico (circa 1955). Examining
these episodes has a few useful features. On the one hand, these coun-
tries have (i) nonmalarial areas that can serve as a comparison group
and (ii) census micro data available that cover the relevant sets of co-
horts. On the other hand, these campaigns began because of advances
in health technology that originated outside the affected regions, which
reduces concerns about reverse causality. The basic finding of the study
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as adults than the preceding generation. This is true both in absolute
terms and when measured relative to comparable cohorts in nonmalar-
ious areas. Further, the timing of things supports my study’s hypothesis
as well: the observed changes coincide with childhood exposure to the
campaigns rather than with preexisting trends. The magnitude of the
malaria‐induced income growth is nontrivial.
How do these estimates compare with Ashraf et al.’s simulated ma-
laria eradication in Zambia? From my study, I chose two regions that
were the most malarial in their respective countries: the Mississippi
Delta states in the United States and the northern third of Brazil. I limit
myself to these two examples in the interest of space. Reduced‐form es-
timates for Mexico and Colombia are similar to those for Brazil, and
magnitudes of income shifts are similar across all four countries when
considered on a per‐infection basis.
Some comparisons of relative disease rates in the three areas/times
are found in panel A1 of table 1. First, we see that malaria accounts for
approximately 10% of deaths in both Zambia today and the Mississippi
Delta in 1890. (Such data for Brazil were not available for circa 1950.) In
contrast, the overall death rate is not quite twice as high in Zambia as in
the delta in 1890, so the malaria death rate per capita is quite a bit higher
in Zambia. Next, I compare estimates of childhood malaria infection in
these areas prior to malaria control efforts. (See my paper for details on
howthesearecomputed.)Bythesecalculations,childhoodmalariainfec-
tionrateswereaboutone‐thirdinMississippiDeltastatesandtwo‐thirds
in northern Brazil and Zambia. Note that this is a point‐in‐time proba-
bility referring to a stock of infection. Finally, the authors report the inci-
dence of fevers among adults to be 33%, which is an annual probability
referring to a flow of new fevers. Because (i) infection continues after an
episode of fevers and (ii) children are more susceptible, this number is a
lower bound for the static, childhood infection rate. Bottom line: malaria
infectionratestodayinZambiaarehigherthanintheMississippiDeltain
1890; instead Zambia’s malaria rate is probably closer to northern Brazil’s
in 1950.
While the malaria burden is roughly similar across these three exam-
ples, Ashraf et al.’s simulated impact of malaria eradication is markedly
different from the estimates using actual eradication campaigns. These
results are found in panel A2 of table 1. Bear in mind that the estimated
impacts from my study reflect one channel (childhood exposure to ma-
laria), whereas the authors’ simulated impacts purport to reflect all
channels through which malaria depresses human capital. The first
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A1. Malarial disease rates:
Fraction of deaths due to malaria 10% … 8.3%
Deaths per 1,000 population, per year 12 … 20
Precampaign malaria infection rate
among children, point in time 33% 67% 67% (c. 1950)
Incidence of cases, adults, per year …… 33%
A2. Long‐run impacts:
Increase in human capital
(partial equilibrium)
a 10%–15% 20%–30% (?)2.75%
Increase in population c. 2.5% c. 5% 5%
Increase in income/worker, adjusted







Childhood infection rate 40% 90%
Drop in adult income from persistent
childhood exposure (partial equilibrium) 43% …
B2. Long‐run impacts:
Average gain in income/worker from
eradication (partial equilibrium) 17% 39%
Increase in income/worker adjusted for
land dilution (general equilibrium) 15% 35%
Note: Panel A considers malaria eradication campaignsin the United States and Brazil and
a hypothetical campaign in Zambia in the present day. For panel A1, data for the United
States and Brazil are drawn from Bleakley (2007b), as is the Zambian estimate for precam-
paign childhood infection. The remaining Zambian numbers in panel A1 are taken from
Ashraf et al.’s estimates. The estimated change in the Zambian population in panel A2
comes from their fig. 21. The corresponding Brazilian number is assumed to be similar,
whereastheU.S.numberissetashalftheZambianvalue,whichtakesintoaccountapprox-
imate differences in malaria rates among these three countries. The malaria eradication–
induced increase in “human capital” for the United States and Brazilian regions is based
onestimatesusingcomparisonsofincomeacrosscohortsinBleakley(2007b).Thecorrespond-
ing(butnotstrictlycomparable)ZambiannumberiscomputedbyAshrafetal.,whoconsider
contributionsto incomefromlowerdisabilityand more yearsinschoolonly. Thesecondrow
in panel A2 presents simulations of the long‐run change (relative to the baseline) in popula-
tionfollowingmalariaeradication.ThenumberforZambiaiscomputedbyAshrafetal.using
ac a u s e ‐deleted life table; the numbers for the United States and Brazil are scaled versions of
the Zambian number using estimates of precampaign malaria infection among children. The
final row in panel A2 adjusts the previous numbers for the effect of land dilution because of
both the increase in population and effective labor supplied. These adjustments follow the
Ashraf et al. methodology, which assumes that different skill types are perfect substitutes
andalandshareof0.1.PanelBconsiderstheantihookwormcampaigninthesouthernUnited
States and a hypotheticalcampaign inBusia, Kenya.Estimates and extrapolationsare drawn
fromBleakley (2007a), exceptfor the final rowinpanel B2, which is computed asinpanel A2
above. Blank cells indicate a lack of data.
aFigures for the Mississippi Delta and northern Brazil come from Bleakley (2007b); the
figure for Zambia comes from Ashraf et al.row of panel A2 displays the estimated partial equilibrium impact on
human capital. Is it plausible that Zambia would have a response to
malaria eradication that is an order of magnitude below what was es-
timated for northern Brazil at midcentury, a region with a comparable
malaria burden? Further, is it not even more surprising that Zambia’s
simulated response is only a quarter of what I estimate for the circa
1920 Mississippi Delta, an area with an undoubtedly lower malaria in-
tensity? The estimated changes in income for the United States and Bra-
zil, as well as results for Colombia and Mexico, were roughly in
proportion to their relative malaria burdens. So why would we expect
Zambia to be so far out of line?
At this point, there seem to be two possibilities: (i) my estimates are
bunk, albeit in a way that is common across all four countries I study;
or (ii) there is something about malaria that makes it incompatible with
the authors’ calculation. Needless to say, I do not favor option i,
although I invite the reader to review the above‐referenced paper and
decide for himself or herself. However, option ii seems probable on the
basis of the presentation above about the incomplete measurement of
malaria morbidity and the inappropriateness of quantity of schooling
as a unitary channel for human capital effects.
In an important contribution, Ashraf et al. show how the increase in
effective labor from malaria eradication will depress productivity in a
land‐dependent economy, so I correct for this in the remainder of panel
A2. Their simulated population change for Zambia is scaled linearly for
the other two regions, on the basis of the estimated infection rates prior
to malaria control. The simulated population change is combined with
the estimated (or simulated) change in human capital to compute the
change in effective labor. (These calculations, like those in Ashraf
et al.’s paper, treat different skill types as perfect substitutes, which
might be a deficiency. See below.) As before, these results show a stark
contrast between the authors’ simulation and my estimated responses
to malaria eradication.
I am not inclined to believe that the result for malaria and morbidity
is an aberration, because this pattern is also seen in my earlier work on
hookworm disease (Bleakley 2007a). Hookworm, a parasite that infects
humans, is like malaria in that it has a large burden of childhood mor-
bidity (including anemia), but with considerably less mortality. The chil-
dren of the southern United States had hookworm infection rates of
30%–40%, and areas of the sandy coastal plain had close to 100% infec-
tion rates among kids. In the 1910s, John D. Rockefeller, being the Bill
Gates of his day, donated a considerable sum of money to a campaign
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and was never treated.
Results of the antihookworm campaign were remarkable. The effect
of deworming children was illustrated in testimonials from across the
region, such as this one from Varnado, Louisiana: “In short, we have
here in our school‐rooms today about 120 bright, rosy‐faced children,
whereas had you not been sent here to treat them we would have had
that many pale‐faced, stupid children” (Rockefeller Sanitary Commis-
sion 1912, 58).
Moving beyond anecdotes, I used census data to systematically ex-
amine the impact of hookworm eradication on children. Similar to
the malaria study cited above, areas that were hookworm free served
as a comparison group. Children growing up in areas that benefited
from the antihookworm campaign saw large increases in literacy and
income, relative to earlier cohorts.
According to my estimates, childhood exposure to hookworm de-
pressed adult income by a lot in the South, and this result suggests that
l a r g eg a i n sf r o mm a s sd e w o r m i n ga r ep o s s i b l ei nA f r i c a .P e r t i n e n t
numbers are seen in panel B of table 1. As mentioned above, children
in the South had a 40% hookworm infection rate circa 1910, which com-
pares with a 90% childhood infection rate from hookworm in the Busia
region of Kenya.
4 My instrumental variables estimates of the effect of
hookworm on income can be interpreted as follows: If I take your
point‐in‐time probability of hookworm infection in childhood from
zero to one, it reduces young adult income by 43%, in natural log terms.
(Note that this refers to persistent infection, not to having ever been in-
fected.) Eradication would therefore imply a long‐run human capital
gain of 17% in the American South. Extrapolating to Busia, we would
expect a 39% long‐run increase in human capital from eradicating
hookworm. Because hookworm disease has little associated mortality,
eradication would imply negligible direct changes in population,
although effective labor would rise with the increase in human capital.
Using the authors’ general equilibrium adjustment, I compute the simu-
lated changes in income per worker, which are a bit lower than the hu-
man capital estimates. (Results are found in panel B2 of table 1.) In any
event, all these numbers point to large income gains from hookworm
eradication.
Estimates from these eradication campaigns also illustrate the prob-
lem with using the quantity of education as the chief channel of child-
hood morbidity effects on income. In none of the cases studied do years
of schooling account for more than a quarter of the effect of income.
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the argument above. Indeed, in one case (malariaeradication in Mexico),
adult income rises with less childhood exposure to malaria, but years of
school actually decrease! It is evident that treating the quantity of educa-
tion as a central outcome is misleading when analyzing certain changes
in health.
Are hookworm and malaria unusual diseases? No, in the sense that
over a billion people worldwide are infected with these and related
parasites. Yes, in the sense that these and related parasites cause a rela-
tively high burden of morbidity, especially among children. These para-
sites tend to persist in the system for a long time, since they have
evolved to fly under our immune system’s radar. These features make
for a sharp contrast with diseases that have high case fatality rates and/
orshort‐livedboutsofmorbidity.Asapointofcontrast,considerchicken
pox. Vaccination may just eradicate the disease starting with my
daughters’ generation, but I myself did not have this prophylaxis
growing up. I spent a week of my childhood at home with the disease
and watched baseball on television. The long‐term consequences for
me were probably not that great: a week of lost school, which I par-
tiallymadeup forbyworkingharderin thesubsequentweeks.Smallpox
isanotherexample:shortbouts ofmorbidityandahigh casefatalityrate;
but generally the residual disfigurement among the survivors does not
cause a high disability burden. Whatever effects eradicating smallpox
had, they probably worked through changes in mortality rates, and the
consequences were therefore very different from the effects of malaria
eradication. It should be clear by now that I do not argue (nor do I be-
lieve) that the eradication of any conceivable disease would necessarily
have such large effects as those seen for hookworm and malaria. But un-
packaging health seems key.
The evidence from historical campaigns against malaria and hook-
worm brings us back to the Abuja declaration, which Ashraf et al. used
to motivate their study. The Abuja document states that income in Africa
would be 37% higher today but for malaria. Results from the Amer-
icas suggest that malaria eradication would increase Zambian income
per capita by 10%–30% in the long run, and Zambia is not the most
malarial country in Africa. Moreover,t h i se s t i m a t ei sj u s tf o rt h eg a i n s
realized via the mechanism of reduced childhood exposure to the dis-
ease. Presumably there are other benefits as well. As the authors men-
tion, a significant cost of malaria might be that investment in physical
capital and land improvement are suppressed by the threat of the dis-
ease. For example, the control of malaria in the Panamanian isthmus
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earlier failure of the same French effort was partly due to a lack of scien-
tificknowledge aboutmalariatransmissionatthetime.Meanwhile,back
in Zambia, Utzinger et al. (2001) argue that the localized control of ma-
laria transmission was a key factor in the development of copper mining
in that country. Finally, Bleakley and Hong (2008) relate agricultural pro-
ductivity in the southern United States to the decline of malaria and find
largeeffects.Theseeffects,likethoselinkedtochildhoodexposureabove,
would nevertheless take some time to kick in.
IV. Whither Population?
A central contribution of Ashraf et al.’s paper is quantifying how much
health improvements will increase population. Increases in population
in large measure stem from people not dying as quickly as before. In
contrast, reductions in morbidity (and increases in human capital) do
not increase population, but do raise the supply of effective labor to a
lesser extent. Again, the type of health shock matters for the result.
Nevertheless, for a given change in health, the long‐run change in
population depends crucially on the response of fertility, as the authors
ably demonstrate. Unfortunately, our understanding of fertility’sa d -
justment to large changes in health (among other things) leaves some-
thing to be desired. As they point out, there has been enormous
heterogeneity in the demographic transition (or lack thereof) both his-
torically in the developed world and in recent generations in less devel-
oped countries. This sort of instability in a reduced‐form relationship
highlights the complicated nature of the comovement between health
and fertility.
Perhaps unpackaging our notion ofh e a l t hab i tc a na i di nu n d e r -
standing the fertility response. Consider three recent studies of fertility,
placedintheframeworkofthequantity/quality(q2)trade‐off.Acemoglu
and Johnson (2007) examine the large declines in mortality (especially
among the very young) that took place circa 1950and find large, positive
responses in birth rates. Their shock is like a decline in the price of quan-
tity (pn ↓) in the q2 model. Accordingly, quantity rises in their estimates.
(Note that slow, monotonic adjustment to a new fertility level would
yieldessentiallythesamebirth rateaftertheshockasbefore.)In contrast,
Fabian Lange and I (Bleakley and Lange 2009) examine the fertility re-
sponse to hookworm eradication in the southern United States. Getting
ridofhookwormineffectreducedthepriceofqualitybecauseitwasnow
easier to rear an educated child. We found that fertility goes down with
Comment 215the reduction in hookworm infection, which is again consistent with the
q2 model.
What about when both prices change? Consider the work of Adrienne
Lucas (2007a, 2007b), who estimates fertility rates before, during, and
after the malaria eradication campaign (circa 1950) in Sri Lanka. Her re-
sults vary by generation. Women in their fertile years around the time of
the campaign had higher fertility following the decline in malaria, but
women in childhood at that time went on to have fertility rates compar-
able to those in the nonmalarious parts of Sri Lanka.
5 Both generations
had a lower pn than previous cohorts, but the second generation, which
had escaped exposure to malaria in childhood, also had higher human
capital.
So, we have three improvements in health and three distinct re-
sponses. I believe that all three lie outside the range of what the authors'
fertility model would have predicted. In contrast, this diversity of ef-
fects seems to make sense in a simple q2 model, although other inter-
pretations are possible. What is clear, however, is that these results are
inconsistent with a univariate model of health. Further research is
needed to better understand the effects of health on fertility.
V. Why Just Malthus?
The improvements in health contemplated in this literature (includ-
ing the paper by Ashraf et al.) are huge, and it seems more than likely
that there would be general equilibrium effects. An important contribu-
tion of this paper is to consider how much the population increase di-
lutes land and capital. But why restrict ourselves to Malthusian effects
when presumably other prices will change as well?
For the moment, consider first the general equilibrium effects of just
population increasing. If the working‐age population rises by x%, does
the average plot of land get x% more farmers? Recent historical experi-
ence suggests otherwise. Latin America, for example, went from 40%
urban at mid‐twentieth century to almost 80% today. Further, the ma-
jority of the world’s population lives in urban areas as of a few years
ago. This situation seems less like an economy that is land dependent
and decreasing returns to scale in reproducible factors. Instead, it seems
like one in which agglomeration economies might kick in. (See Jena et al.
[2007] for more analysis on the point.)
How does it modify the results if all the extra population goes to the
city? In the short run, we should obtain similar capital dilution and com-
positional change in the population. In the medium run, fertility will
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when theeconomyhasboth rural andurban sectors.Finally,in the long
run, land is much less of a constraint than in the Ashraf et al. simula-
tions. (Even in a highly urbanized economy, congestion effects will re-
m a i ni no n ef o r mo ra n o t h e r ,a l b e i to n e st h a tk i c ki na tam u c hh i g h e r
population density.)
Beyond just population, health improvements will change the mix of
skills in the labor force. Ashraf et al. use a simplifying assumption that
different types of skills—health, schooling, and experience—are perfect
substitutes. While we do not know much about these parameters for
poor countries, estimates in the labor literature for the United States
contradict this assumption.
Relaxing the assumption of perfect substitution among skill types will
tend to magnify the range of uncertainty in their simulations, and again
this will depend on which element of the health vector is being changed.
Consider a few cases. First, suppose that the shock to health brings more
human capital to an economy in which skilled labor is very scarce. In this
case, the response of output would be more positive than in the Ashraf
et al. baseline. Suppose instead that the change in health did little but de-
creasemortalityamonginfantsinpoorfamilies.Thiswouldlikelyincrease
the supply of low‐skilled labor in an economy that is already skill scarce
and depress average income even more than the authors’ baseline.
Finally, the assumption of a closed economy seems increasingly unre-
alistic for the twenty‐first century. How would openness change the re-
sults? In their sensitivity analysis, the authors allow for capital to flow in
from the outside world. Not surprisingly, this reduces capital dilution,
and therefore output per capita falls less in the short run when popula-
tion rises. Next, openness to international trade would surely modify the
authors’ results. If the economy is reasonably diversified, we would ex-
pect the price responses to health changes to be attenuated (and, in the
extreme, we would expect factor price equalization). Finally, migration
can act as a “safety valve” when an area becomes overpopulated. For ex-
ample, Hanson and McIntosh (2007) find that relatively large birth co-
horts in Mexico had higher propensities to migrate to the United States.
The empirical literature analyzing general equilibrium effects of
health shocks provides a range of estimates that is even larger than that
of Ashraf et al.’s sensitivity analysis. Perhaps most consistent with their
results is a classic study by Schultz (1964). He considers the impact of
the 1918 influenza pandemic on farm output in India. The flu killed
substantialnumbersinIndiabutleftcapitalandlandintact,anditalso
had little scarring effect on adults who survived. Schultz therefore
Comment 217interprets the flu mortality as a decline in population only. Comparing a
few years before to a few years after the epidemic (i.e., the short run), he
measuresdeclinesinoutputthat weregreaterinareasthat sufferedmore
flu deaths. The magnitude of this relationship was consistent with a
labor share of around 0.5. This result is in line with those of Ashraf
et al., at least for the short run.
In contrast, two recent studies find markedly different responses of
aggregate output to health shocks. In cross‐national data, Acemoglu
and Johnson (2007) find that, following a decline in mortality, there
w a sa ni n c r e a s ei np o p u l a t i o nb u tn ostatistically significant rise in
GDP. These results are qualitatively similar to Ashraf et al.’s “worst‐
case” scenario in which fertility adjusts very slowly and the land share
is high. Quantitatively, however, Acemoglu and Johnson’se s t i m a t e d
population change is considerably higher than any that Ashraf et al.’s
model can generate, and, moreover, the decline in GDP per capita is
much larger than they would predict, even accounting for the higher‐
than‐simulated increase in population. In my own work (Bleakley
2007c), I estimate the aggregate (i.e., state‐level) responses to the
above‐mentioned campaigns against hookworm and malaria in the
United States. Areas that stood to benefit from eradication saw slow
increases in output that tracked the entrance into the workforce of co-
horts born late enough to have escaped childhood exposure to these
diseases. Such long lags are consistent with Ashraf et al.’s simulations
in which the health effects on productivity operate at the cohort level
(via early‐life health) rather than contemporaneously with the change
in health. My estimated magnitudes are, if anything, larger than what
I obtain in the earlier cohort‐level estimates (which are already larger
than what the authors simulate, as I discuss above). At the risk of sound-
ing like a broken record, the contrasting results of these two studies
seem linked to the different sorts of changes in health considered, with
the former tilted toward mortality (especially infant) and the latter to-
ward childhood morbidity.
VI. Concluding Thoughts
What is the motivation of economists in studying interrelationships be-
tween health and development? Is the goal to understand whether
health is the single factor that explains everything, leading to a “magic
bullet” intervention that fixes everything? Are we instead looking for
doable interventions that pass the cost/benefit test? If it is the former,
health—however defined—is certain to fail. If it is the latter, then we
Bleakley 218should turn our attention to the numerous examples of successful cam-
paigns, some of which are based on century‐old technology.
One important issue that remains is whether it is feasible to under-
take such interventions where they are most needed. Above, I dis-
cussed Rockefeller’s campaign against hookworm in the American
South, but an interesting episode for comparison comes from Puerto
Rico. Around the same time, a commission from the U.S. Army spon-
sored an antihookworm campaign throughout that Caribbean island.
Large gains against hookworm were realized immediately after the
campaign. Unfortunately, the colonial government provided very little
follow‐up support, and these gains had mostly disappeared a decade
later. Improving health is a long, hard slog, and potential intervention-
ists should be prepared for as much.
Endnotes
I thank Jane Fortson and Miriam Wasserman for helpful discussions.
1. The other disease‐specific case the authors consider is tuberculosis. This is a disease
whose effects occur mostly in adulthood and whose morbidity is reasonably well mea-
sured. As a consequence, it might be well approximated by the sum of the various chan-
nels articulated by the authors.
2. Using a randomized trial of iron supplements in Indonesia, Thomas et al. (2003)
show that anemia depresses contemporaneous adult productivity.
3. So‐called tropical diseases, such as malaria and hookworm, were present in sub-
tropical regions a century ago and were in many cases the focus of “big push” campaigns
for eradication.
4. DataonhookworminfectionforZambiawerenotreadilyavailable.BusiaandZambia
areecologically similarto some degree(similaraltitudesandtemperatures,bothproximate
to great lakes). However, Zambia is a bit more rich and urbanized and has more seasonal
rainfall, all of which would suggest a lower hookworm infection rate in Zambia.
5. These three studies of fertility all use never‐infected or minimally infected areas as
comparison groups, and statements about the effects of health changes are estimated
relative to the control areas. Such areas did not benefit directly from the health improve-
ments, but would have been exposed to many of the other shocks that prevailed in the
episodes studied.
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